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Abstract
The global eradication of polio is close to achieving success. However, transmission of 
wild poliovirus persists in countries where the disease is endemic, and outbreaks may also 
occur in previously polio-free countries where population immunity is not maintained. 
To achieve polio eradication, several key actions are required: (1) to detect any poliovi-
rus transmission, (2) to strengthen immunization systems and withdraw all oral polio 
vaccines from use, (3) to contain polioviruses and certify interruption of transmission, 
and (4) to sustain ongoing public health programs. In this context, residual hurdles to 
global polio eradication have been identified, from unstable political situation in affected 
countries to population movements from and to endemic areas, and opposition to immu-
nization strategies. Global efforts are needed in order to promote routine immunization 
campaigns and large-scale vaccination rounds, which may provide direct protection of 
individuals and minimize virus circulation. 
In 1988, the World Health Assembly adopted a reso-
lution that committed all countries to polio eradication 
by the year 2000, launching the Global Polio Eradica-
tion Initiative (GPEI). Since then, several WHO Regions 
have been certified polio-free, including the Americas (in 
1994), the Western Pacific Region (in 2000), the Euro-
pean Region (in 2002), and the South-East Asia Region, 
which includes the Indian subcontinent and Indonesia 
(in 2014). Importantly, the circulation of type 2 wild po-
liovirus (WPV) has been successfully stopped since 1999. 
Then, since November 2012, when the last WPV3 case 
was reported in Nigeria, WPV1 has been the only circu-
lating wild type virus. Overall, more than 15 million cases 
of paralysis have been prevented and an estimated 1.5 
million childhood death avoided through the administra-
tion of vitamin A during polio prevention activities [1].
Although a great success has been achieved, with a 
decrease in the incidence of paralytic polio from an es-
timated 1000 children per day in 1988 to about 400 
in 2013, progress towards eradication has been slower 
than expected [2]. Up to now, polio remains endemic 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan, that reported 54 and 14 
cases, respectively, in the year 2015. In 2016, only 14 
cases have been reported in Pakistan and 9 in Afghani-
stan so far, but in Nigeria, where no cases had been 
detected in 2015, 3 cases of paralytic polio have been 
recently identified [3].
Further information on the circulation of poliovi-
ruses is provided by environmental surveillance. At 
the end of May 2013, WPV1 closely related to strains 
circulating in polio endemic areas of Pakistan and to 
those isolated from sewage samples in Egypt in 2012 
was detected in a sewage-treatment plant in the South 
district of Israel [4, 5]. In 2014-2015, WPVs were iso-
lated from environmental samples collected in Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan [6], and in 2016, 5 out of 
27 environmental samples from the Belucistan province 
of Pakistan were found positive for poliovirus strains 
which probably originated in Afghanistan. To this re-
gard, it is worthwhile to mention that in Belucistan, 
where an anti-polio campaign having the aim of vac-
cinating about 2.4 million < 5 years old children is start-
ing at the end of September, militants have repeated 
attacked polio teams, and a suicide bombing outside 
a polio centre in Quetta’s Satellite Town area killed 14 
people, including 13 policemen earlier this year (www.
dawn.com/news/1285841/environmental-samples-test-
positive-for-poliovirus-in-quetta-pishin-districts).
Thus, poliovirus circulation is still ongoing in restricted 
geographical areas. In accordance with the Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative (GPEI), a country may be defined 
as (1) “endemic”, when indigenous WPV circulation has 
never stopped, (2) “outbreak”, if indigenous WPV cir-
culation has stopped but it is affected by outbreak of 
imported WPV or circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus 
(VDPV), or (3) key at-risk (for outbreaks), if no longer 
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poliovirus-infected, but at high risk of outbreaks.
The determinants of polio persistence may be rep-
resented by gaps in routine and supplemental vaccine 
coverage, poor vaccine efficacy (i.e., monovalent vac-
cines may be more effective than trivalent vaccines 
against specific types, especially in developing coun-
tries where interference with other enteroviruses and 
failure to establish infection in children with diarrhea 
may commonly occur), and highly favorable conditions 
for the transmission of fecal-oral pathogens (i.e., high 
population density and poor sanitation, which may also 
lead to a high prevalence of diarrhea) [7].
POLIO PERSISTENCE AND OUTBREAKS: 
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE, CIVIL UNREST, 
LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION
Among the causes favoring the failure of vaccination 
programs against polio, the religious opposition by fun-
damentalists is one of the main factor, as reported  in 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan [8]. In tribal areas 
of Pakistan, local Taliban have issued fatwas denounc-
ing vaccination as an Western plot to sterilize Muslim 
populations; wild polio virus from endemic districts in 
Afghanistan reemerged in previously polio-free areas in 
Pakistan, where several polio vaccination workers had 
been shot and killed [9]. 
In Somalia, which had been polio-free for 5 years, the 
virus was re-introduced in 2013, causing almost 200 cas-
es of flaccid paralysis [10]. Similarly to the three endemic 
countries, Somalia was affected by violence and insecuri-
ty, and population hostility towards health-care workers, 
with coverage with 3 doses of OPV vaccine < 50% [11].
Social disruption due to civil war, with consequent 
decline of vaccine coverage, has been a driver of a re-
surgence of polio in Syria, where tens of cases of para-
lytic polio occurred between 2013 and 2014. A case of 
WPV1 was identified also in the outskirts of Baghdad, 
that had been polio-free for 14 years [12, 13]. This out-
break, which probably originated in Pakistan, occurred 
almost simultaneously with another outbreak in the 
Horn of Africa, tempered the optimism due to the suc-
cess achieved in polio control in India, where no cases 
had been reported in the last 3 years. 
Major epidemic events causing a collapse of health 
services may also affect vaccination coverage. A para-
digmatic example is represented by the 2014-2015 Eb-
ola outbreak occurred in three West-African countries 
(Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). To this regard, 
promed, on October 13, reported about 6 cases of sus-
pected polio occurring in the Nimba province of Libe-
ria (www.bushchicken.com/health-authorities-suspect-
cases-of-polio-in-nimba/).
Although the estimations for vaccination coverage 
in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia already painted a 
grim picture, the Ebola outbreak probably exacerbated 
the problem favoring the collapse of health services and 
the further drop of vaccination rates.
THERE IS A RISK FOR EUROPE?
To what extent imported polio cases pose a threat to 
the health of European citizens is matter of debate. The 
last endemic case of paralytic polio in the WHO Euro-
pean Region was reported in Turkey in November 1998, 
but a large outbreak of about 500 cases of poliomyelitis, 
due to a WPV1 imported from India, occurred in Tajiki-
stan in 2010 [14]. In today European Union countries, 
an outbreak of 71 cases (59 paralysis and 2 death) oc-
curred in an unvaccinated religious community in the 
Netherlands in 1992 [15], whereas other 3 cases were 
identified among Roma children in Bulgaria in 2001 
[16]. These episodes remind us that reintroduction of 
polioviruses cannot be completely ruled out, and that 
maintaining high coverage of immunization is key to 
avoid the spread of the virus, especially among vulner-
able population groups. To this regard, recent data from 
Italy report a vaccination coverage below 95%, which is 
considered the acceptable threshold for polio elimination 
(www.salute.gov.it/portale/documentazione/p6_2_8_ 
3_1.jsp?%20lingua=%20italiano%20&id=20).
VACCINE-DERIVED PARALYTIC 
POLIOVIRUS CIRCULATION:  
THE PREVENTION PARADOX
Thanks to vaccine use, the burden of polio has been 
strongly reduced. However, the use of OPV is not free 
from rare but sometimes severe adverse events. First of 
all, OPV may revert to neurovirulence, leading to the 
development of cases of vaccine-associated paralytic 
poliomyelitis (VAPP) among vaccine recipients and 
their contacts (risk of VAPP: 1 per 900 000 first dos-
es, with a 25-fold decline for further doses). Secondly, 
during prolonged infection in persons with primary im-
munodeficiency disorders or during outbreaks in set-
tings with low OPV coverage, genetically divergent (> 
1% divergence for PV1 and 3, and > 0.6% for type 2) 
VDPV may emerge. VDPVs may cause paralytic polio 
and have the potential for sustained circulation [17]. 
In particular, the risk of cVDPV strains emerging from 
OPV is higher when polio vaccination coverage is low.
Experience acquired with a large outbreak of type 
2 cVDPV in Nigeria demonstrated that the pathoge-
nicity and the severity of paralytic disease, as well as 
the transmissibility, are similar to those of WPVs [18]. 
Thus, interrupting the transmission of a cVDPV may re-
quire measures and level of protection similar to those 
needed to control an outbreak caused by WPV.
In the last decade, several sporadic cases and out-
breaks due to circulating VDPV (cVDPV) were re-
ported. At least five independent cVPDV2 outbreaks 
occurred in Pakistan since 2012, and several events 
peaking in 2009, followed by low-level circulation, were 
detected in Nigeria. Small clusters due to cVDPV2 and 
cVDPV1 were detected in South Sudan and in Mada-
gascar, respectively [19].
In Europe, no cases of cVDPV were reported since 
the year 2000 until the end of August 2015, when two 
cases of paralytic poliomyelitis caused by cVDPV1 were 
detected in Ukraine [20].
ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE:  
PROS AND CONS
Taking into account both the epidemiological op-
portunities and the potential risks of failure, the Polio 
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Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 
was developed by WHO, with the aim eradicating both 
wild polioviruses and VDPV [21]. 
Enhanced environmental surveillance may be a useful 
early warning tool for the detection of polio virus circu-
lation; however, it may be difficult to sustain financially 
in many countries [22], it does not provide convinc-
ing evidence of actual transmission in humans, and its 
methods are not yet standardized [23].
However, the identification of poliovirus, either WPV 
or cVDPV, is indicative of pockets of susceptibles (un-
vaccinated or incompletely vaccinated persons) in an 
area where individuals infected with the virus contrib-
ute to the transmission cycle amongst other suscep-
tibles. As soon as the number of reported polio cases 
decreases, environmental surveillance (testing sewage 
for polioviruses) becomes key to supplement AFP sur-
veillance in order to detect early events and unapparent 
WPV and/or VDPV circulation [6].
CONCLUSIONS
Despite significant progress in the global polio eradi-
cation efforts, polio outbreaks may occur until the 
transmission of the poliovirus will be stopped globally. 
In 2015, only 3 countries continue to have endemic 
circulation of wild polio virus: Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Nigeria. However, other regions in the world are 
still considered at risk for polio outbreaks [3]. All coun-
tries, in particular those characterized by population 
movement and contact with polio-affected countries, 
need to strengthen the surveillance of cases of acute 
flaccid paralysis (AFP), in order to rapidly detect any 
virus importation and to facilitate a rapid response. In 
this context, high routine immunization coverage is re-
quired to minimize the consequences of virus reintro-
duction and reactive vaccination strategies are needed 
in case of outbreaks. Early detection and effective re-
sponse to the emergence of VDPV is also a key to the 
maintenance of the polio-free status. To this end, in-
ternational organizations, goverments, and stakehold-
ers need to join in a global effort to devise effective 
eradication strategies.
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